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(2) Additional deducation for spouse
Japanese income tax allows an individual entrepreneur to split their income

the total tax burden by paying salary to his spouse and other members of his family

to the business. For wage earners, however, there was not a way of income-spl
wives also made contributions at home to their earnings. This situation gave ris
there was an imbalance of the tax burden between wage earners and individual e

In order to correct the imbalance, an additional deduction for spouses was creat

spouse's income is less than a certain amount is allowed to deduct from the tot
in addition to the ordinary deduction for spouses of ¥330,000. It should be men
duction of the new deduction originated from the comprehensive reform package.
2 . Reform of the Tax-Exempt Saving System

The approved reform of the tax-exempt saving system contains little diversi
proposal.
Effective on April 1 of next year, broad scoped tax exemptions will be converted to cover only
the savings of those in need of help such as elderly people, etc. The former exemption on savings
earmarked for the build-up of employee's assets, or "Zaikei," will be restricted to those earmarked for
house acquisition or pension purposes. In the original proposal, "Zaikei" savings are subject to a special
10 percent tax.

3. Other Revisions

Concerning the taxation on capital gains from land transactions, "super short-term land tran
tions," or certain land resold within 2 years from acquisition are now taxed more heavily than ordin
short-term sales, in order to discourage speculation. Expecting positive effects on land supply, th
plication of alleviated taxation on long-term transactions was extended to sales made more than 5
after acquisition, against 10 years previously.
Individuals are immune from taxation on capital gains from stock sales except "continuous or m
sive sales" as defined. With the emphasis on the enlargement of the tax base, the definition of ta

sales are extended.

THE JAMAICAN FLAT RATE INCOME TAX*
Roy Bahl

Maxwell Professor of Political Economy
Syracuse University

The individual income tax is one of Jamaica's most productive sources of gover
and certainly its most visible. By 1985, revenue yield had risen to about 7 percent of
Before reform in 1986, however, both the structure and the administration of the tax w

As a result, the tax produced less revenue than it might have, was unfair in its distribut
and created severe disincentives for private sector economic growth. The material prese
describes the background analysis which guided the major reform.
In theory, Jamaica's income tax was highly progressive because of both its graduate
and its use of numerous tax credits that attempted to take account of the special cir
dividual taxpayers. In practice, the progressi vity of the tax was markedly diminished
enabled avoidance of income taxes by middle and upper income residents, and by out
tax structure was widely criticized for its complexity and the tax administration fo

*This work draws from the research results of the Jamaica Tax Reform Projec

from James Aim and Roy Bahl, "An Evaluation of the Structure of the Jamaican Perso

Jamaica Tax Structure Examination Project Staff Paper No. 15, Metropolitan Studie
Maxwell School (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, December 1984 [revised Marc
Bahl and Matthew Murray, "Income Tax Evasion in Jamaica," Jamaica Tax Struc
Project Staff Paper No. 31, Metropolitan Studies Program, The Maxwell School (S
acuse University, November 1986).

This content downloaded from
131.96.28.155 on Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:23:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

1 22 NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION- TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA

unwillingness, to bring untaxed allowances into the tax base and to put self-employed professionals o
the tax rolls. These factors led to a narrow tax base, reduced the perceived and realized fairness of
tax, and generated still greater resistance to compliance.
Prior to 1986, the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) had not undertaken a comprehensive structu
tax reform in many years.1 Rather, it attempted to reconcile its problem of taxing a narrower ba
cover a chronically large deficit by raising the tax rate. This generated even greater incentives fo
evasion and tax avoidance, and the Government responded by providing more loopholes (the last
a preferential tax rate for overtime earnings). On the administrative front, one sensed that the GOJ
unwilling to rigidly enforce its income tax precisely because it had become so burdensome. Becau
this continuing scenario, authorities were concerned that the distortions in economic activity that st
from high rates and a steeply progressive rate structure had become a serious impediment to continu
growth of the economy.
The Economic and Policy Setting

The Jamaica case may dispel a longstanding myth about comprehensive tax reform: the prop
that it cannot take place in a weak economic setting. The following will give some idea of th
economic policy during this period.

• There was a serious exchange rate disequalibrium which eventually led to a devaluation
ning in 1983.
• The bauxite industry collapsed, depriving the Government of a major foreign exchange

The performance of tourism, the other major foreign exchange earning sector, was spotty

• There was a substantial government deficit (down to around 8 percent of GDP in 1985

is an especially important policy issue because the Government is a major employer of uns
workers, hence expenditure retrenchment (vs. revenue increases) would be a very difficul
• There was a heavy debt service burden, averaging over 45 percent of export earnings in th
1980s.

• Both the inflation rate and the unemployment rate remained high during most of this period.
• The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank brought pressure on the Government to
take drastic measures to control the size of the fiscal deficit, and to reform its tariff structure.
• It was reasonable during this period to suppose that a US tax reform was in the offing, and that
the lower US corporate tax rate would force a reduction in the Jamaican corporate tax rate.

In short, there was a great deal of pressure to find ways of raising more revenue to solve some of the
Government's immediate problems. The prospects of having to raise tax rates in the short run to eliminate
a revenue shortfall would seem incompatible with the goal of developing a structural reform that would
gain broad public support and stimulate new private investment.

But not all was negative. Prime Minister Edward Seaga was elected in 1980 with a mandate to

"free-up the economy," and there was much to free up. The foreign trade sector was characterized by
quotas and licensing to restrict imports and compensate for an overvalued Jamaican dollar. An import
substitution growth strategy and a complicated tariff structure were in place, and there were substantial
price controls, government ownership of some traditionally private sector activities, and very high marginal income tax rates. The Prime Minister's economic strategy of replacing government controls with
market forces fit very well with a structural tax reform program designed to "get the prices right."
Moreover, the Seaga administration won an overwhelming majority in Parliament in a 1984 election.
This enhanced the possibilities of eventually passing a tax reform bill. Another stimulus to action in this
area came from the external donors - the United States government, the World Bank, and the IMF all of whom were enthusiastic about Jamaica's plans for tax reform. Finally, the Jamaican income tax
had become so onerous, so obviously unfair and so out of control that there was substantial public
sentiment for a major overhaul of the system. In many ways, then, the time was right for tax reform.
The Tax System Prior to Reform

Like individual income tax systems in many other countries, that in Jamaica has as its concept
starting point the taxation of each individual's "comprehensive income," or the income from any
all sources. Jamaica is also like other countries in that it deviated in significant ways from this id
definition of income: capital gains were not taxed, the base was not adjusted for changes in the p
level, imputed income escaped the tax, as did many allowances for fringe benefits paid to employ
and much capital income was exempt from the tax. The tax base was also reduced by widespread
evasion, especially among the self-employed. Estimates of the amount of income actually subject to
individual income tax suggest that less than one-third of national income was included in the base;
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base was only slightly more than one-fourth of Gross Domestic Product. Th
was therefore far from a tax on comprehensive income.
Tax Credits

Individual income tax revenues were also reduced by sixteen possible tax credits. The total revenue
cost of these credits in 1983 was estimated at roughly J$325 million, or nearly the amount of revenues
actually obtained from the tax. The lengthy list of credits also added to the complexity of the tax law

and to the costs of tax administration.

The results of a quantitative analysis show that the credit system enhanced the vertical equity of
the individual income tax - it substantially reduced the tax burden on lower income taxpayers, and i
benefited upper income taxpayers to a much lesser degree. The cost of this equity, however, was sub
stantial. Eliminating all "redundant" credits (those which exceed tax liability), the tax reform project
estimated that the cost of the credit system was equivalent to 92 percent of income tax revenues in 1980
and 78 percent in 1983.
Rate Structure

The rate structure of the individual income tax was both high and steeply progressive, at least
comparison with many other nations. The statutory tax rates as of 1984 are shown in Table 1. W
respect to the individual income tax proper, marginal tax rates rise from 30 percent on the first $7
of statutory income to 57.5 percent on income above J$14,000. In 1984, a special notch was create
to provide relief to taxpayers earning less than J$7,000. In effect, those earning less than J$5,080
having no credit claims beyond the personal and special credits, were exempt from tax.

Such a progressive rate structure has significant advantages. If effectively administered, it increa
the government's potential for redistrubting income from rich to poor and for generating greater reve

as incomes grow. On the other hand, it may also provide significant disincentives to work effort,
mestic investment, savings, and compliance. The GOJ attempted to offset some of the disincentive
labor by mandating a maximum tax rate of 30 percent on overtime pay, but the basic disadvanta

remained: Jamaican taxpayers reached the 57.5 percent rate at the relatively low income level of J$14,0
Allowances

Jamaican employees receive compensation in two basic forms: wages and salaries, which are s
to the individual income tax; and nontaxable perquisites or "allowances," which were in principle
to tax but which were in practice not taxed. Allowances are cash or in-kind supplements to w
may be given for a variety of purposes, ranging from profit sharing and bonuses to housing, tr
entertainment, meals, utilities, and uniforms. Because allowances were generally not taxed, t
substituted for wages and salaries, and this substitution narrowed the tax base and imposed a
cost. We estimated that the revenue cost was on the order of 25 percent of collections.
TABLE 1

CURRENT RATE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX

Statutory Income3 Marginal Tax Rate
If Income is Less Than J$7,000
J$
0-4,000
0
J$4, 001-7, 000 .70

If Income is More Than
J$
0-7,000
.30
7,001-10,000
10,001-12,000
12,001-14,000
14,001 and over

J$7,00

.40
.45
.50
.575

a"Statutory Income" is the tax ba
on the personal income tax return. I
rent of land, houses, or other prope
or other annual payments arising wi
and trade, business, profession, or

SOURCE:

Income

Tax
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Base, Revenues and Average Rates

This analysis was based heavily upon the results of a stratified random sample of PAYE and
dividual tax returns for tax year 1983. The sample data were adjusted, or "blown up," to represen
estimated populations of PAYE and Individual taxpayers. The estimated distributions of taxable in
and tax payments are described in Table 2. The "1983 tax structure" is essentially the system that w

be reformed in 1986.

The estimated 1983 distribution for all taxpayers shows an average tax rate of about 19 percent,
progressive distribution of effective rates, and a credit system that made the income tax substantiall
more progressive. A comparison with the results of a similar analysis of 1980 data gives some interesting
results. Statutory income appears to have increased by about 65 percent during this period, the incom
distribution shifted toward the higher brackets, and the average tax rate increased from 17.2 percent to
19 percent. About 20 percent of total taxes were paid by those with incomes above J$20,000 in 1983.
The nominal progressivity of the Jamaican income tax declined between 1980 and 1983 because highe
income taxpayers were able to either evade taxes, take advantage of extra "business expenses," or mak
substantial use of an "overtime" loophole - to charge off a part of their taxable income at a 30 percen
rate rather than at the higher marginal tax rate. The "cost" of credits fell from 91 percent to 77 percen
of revenues. The implied income elasticity of income tax revenues in 1983 is a whopping 1.87: there
was a 1.28 percent revenue increase for each 1 percent statutory income increase, and a 1.46 percen
statutory income increase for each 1 percent increase in GNP.
Problems with the System

At the outset of the tax reform project, assessment of Jamaica's tax problems pointed to three issu

First, taxes were too high. This is a normative statement and requires some qualification. Taxes we
too high by comparison with other countries at similar levels of income and foreign trade. More i
portant, however, is that the Jamaican system taxed such a narrow base that the average and marg
rates of taxation had to be very high to generate an adequate revenue yield. For example, a value ad
tax, equal in yield to the present indirect tax system and using the same exemptions as existed in 1983

would have required a rate of about 20 percent. Another example is that the top marginal personal incom

tax rate was 57.5 percent (not including payroll taxes) and was reached at the relatively low incom

level of J$14000.

The second basic problem was that the tax structure was deficient. It was complicated and costly
to administer and there were important disincentives inherent in the rate and base structures. Interest
was tax free but dividends were taxed twice, there was a high income tax rate on formal sector (PAYE)
labor income but the self-employed went virtually untaxed, the high marginal tax rates produced a substantial incentive for evasion and avoidance, many types of imports were exempt from the indirect tax

system, and so on. The system was also characterized by a poor enforcement which compounded the
inequities. The problem was simply that the Jamaican tax structure had evolved over a erpiod of time as much because of year-to-year IMF pressures to solve budget deficits as for any other reason. By 1983
the issue was clear: the government had gone as far as it could with piecemeal tax reform and the time
was right for a comprehensive overhaul of the tax structure.
Third, the administration of the tax system was weak. There were too few trained tax administrators, salaries were not competitive with the private sector and there was limited opportunity for advancement. These administrative problems were heightened by the complicated system which was difficult to administer in any case, and by outmoded procedures. For example, there was no manual for
income tax administration, nor were there procedures in place to assess the self-employed or to use third
party information to detect nonreporting or under-reporting. Audit activities were limited and not productive, and the administration of the income and payroll taxes was not integrated. Finally, the administrative system was manual rather than computerized and there was general disarray in the recordkeeping. The result of this poor administration, and of the loopholes in the system, was that less than
one-half of the revenue potential of the tax was being reached (Table 3).
The tax reform project took the view that the highest reform priorities were (a) simplification of
the system and (b) making the tax structure more netural with respect to consumer and investor choices.
The policy direction of these objectives is clear: establish broader based, flatter rate taxes that are more
easily administered. The basic hypothesis is that the price effects introduced by nonneutralities in the
Jamaican tax system do matter, i.e., the tax system has contributed to a reduced work effort, increased
capital and labor mobility from the formal to the self-employed sector, thin capitalization, capital flight,
low investment relative to consumption, and a larger underground economy.
The project did not take the view that the correct tax reform strategy was to develop a system that

would lead and "fine tune" economic policy. The general position taken was that the market and not

This content downloaded from
131.96.28.155 on Mon, 24 Oct 2022 18:23:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

TAX REFORM: A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT 1 25

TABLE 2

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME, CREDITS, AND TAXES FOR PAYE TAXPAYERS FOR 1983:
1983 TAX RATES

(based on Revenue Board Sample)
(amounts in thousands of Jamaican dollars3)
Number of "Straight-Time"

Taxpayers Total Statutory Income Incom
Percent

Percent

Statutory

of

Percent

of

Percent

of

of

Income Class Number Total Amount Total Amount Total Amount Total

Under J$2, 000 26,143 10.59 J$ 26,549.1 1.32 J$ 26,549.1 1.43 J$ 0.0 0.00
2,001-4,000 32,115 13.01 96,429.5 4.81 96,429.5 5.20 0.0 0.00
4,001-6,000 33,163 13.44 170,274.1 8.49 170,274.1 9.18 0.0 0.00
6,001-8,000 38,873 15.75 270,505.9 13.48 266,297.3 14.35 4,208.6 2.79
8,001-10,000 43,344 17.56 399,975.0 19.93 360,835.1 19.45 39,139.9 25.90
10,001-12,000 36,274 14.70 395,154.9 19.69 357,109.9 19.25 38,044.9 25.18
12,001-14,000 14,748 5.97 190,549.4 9.50 175,212.6 9.44 15,336.9 10.15
14,001-16,000 8,188 3.32 121,756.0 6.07 110,256.0 5.94 11,500.0 7.61
16,001-18,000 3,770 1.53 63,819.2 3.18 57,734.4 3.11 6,084.8 4.03
18,001-20,000 2,814 1.14 53,312.3 2.66 47,676.1 2.57 5,636.3 3.73
20,001-25,000 3,119 1.26 68,947.2 3.44 60,126.6 3.24 8,820.6 5.84
25,001-30,000 1,724 0.70 46,943.6 2.34 40,571.6 2.19 6,372.0 4.22
30,001-50,000 2,237 0.91 81,442.7 4.06 70,154.5 3.78 11,288.2 7.47
Over J$50,000 312 0.13 20,876.3 1.04 16,206.8 0.87 4,669.4 3.09
Total 246,823 100.01 J$2,006,535.2 100.01 J$1 ,855,433.6 100.00 J$151, 101.7 100.01

Effective Credits Taxes Payable Average Averr 2
Percent Percent Tax Rate: Tax ř .«.e:

Statutory of of 1983 1983 Schedule

Income Class Amount Total Amount Total Schedule Without Credits Difference

Under J$2, 000 J$ 5,877.6 2.02 J$ 2,087 0.54 .079 .300 .221
2,001-4,000 20,346.4 6.99 8,582 2.22 .087 .300 .213
4,001-6,000 31,832.5 10.94 19,250 4.99 .112 .300
6,001-8,000 47,310.2 16.25 34,264 8.88 .126 .301
8,001-10,000 66,295.8 22.78 59,440 15.40 .149 .314
10,001-12,000 60,098.5 20.65 69,399 17.98 .175 .327
12,001-14,000 23,910.8 8.22 42,291 10.96 .221 .347
14,001-16,000 13,471.0 4.63 30,786 7.97 .253 .363
16,001-18,000 6,191.4 2.13 18,253 4.73 .286 .383
18,001-20,000 4,438.7 1.53 16,745 4.34 .314 .397
20,001-25,000 4,888.2 1.68 23,569 6.11 .341 .412
25,001-30,000 2,586.3 0.89 17,863 4.63 .380 .435
30,001-50,000 3,369.5 1.16 34,100 8.83 .418 .460
Over J$50, 000 437.4 0.15 9,411 2.44 .450 .472

.188
.175
.166
.152
.126
.111
.097
.083
.071
.055
.042
.022

Total

aExcept
Statutory
Inco
bAppendix
D
describes
income
was
determined.
less
than
J$7,000
so
all
cSome
totals
may
not
a
dTotal
credits
claimed
credits
than
they
had
in
eRatio
of
total
tax
paya
SOURCE:
Computed
fr
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TABLE 3

REVENUE POTENTIAL FROM TAXED AND NONTAXED INCOME IN 1983:
BY INCOME CLASS

(amounts in thousands of Jamaican dollars8)
Taxes

Full Taxation Payable on
of
Fully
U nderreported T axed

Taxes Payable and Full Income as
Statutory on Statutory Full Taxation Unreported Taxation of a Percent
Income Class Income of Overtime0 Incomeb Allowances0 Total of Total

Under J$2, 000 J$ 2,083.5 J$ - J$ 0.0 J$ 402 J$ 2,485.5 83.8

2,001-4,000 8,745.4 - 43.1 2,077 10,865.5 80.1
4,001-6,000 27,835.9 - 300.2 5,130 33,266.1 83.7
6,001-8,000 40,964.3 660.2 1,083.0 9,099 51,806.5 79.1
8,001-10,000 48,220.2 3,593.1 2,167.8 12,246 66,227.1 72.8
10,001-12,000 54,915.1 4,659.5 3,118.2 14,626 77,318.8 71.0
12,001-14,000 42,912.0 6,420.3 3,129.2 13,931 66,392.5 64.6
14,001-16,000 29,222.3 4,475.4 8,831.1 10,962 53,490.8 54.6
16,001-18,000 23,122.5 5,200.5 5,826.3 10,004 44,153.3 52.4
18,001-20,000 25,770.8 3,441.9 6,026.3 9,919 45,158.0 57.1
20,001-25,000 32,629.4 6,173.5 42,118.1 14,859 95,780.0 34.1
25,001-30,000 17,639.3 1,962.1 35,193.5 5,202 54,794.9 32.2
30,001-50,000 15,666.4 5,244.3 91,932.8 4,359 117,202.5 13.4
Over J$50,000 18,453.9 6,384.0 119,102.7 3,957 147,897.6 12.5
Total

aExcept Statutory Income Class which is expressed in Jam
bEstimated by "individually" adding to statutory income an
component to statutory income, assuming all other componen
The difference between this liability and that shown in colum
component.

SOURCE: Computed from James Aim and Roy Bahl, "
maican Individual Income Tax," Jamaica Tax Structure Exam
ropolitan Studies Program, The Maxwell School (Syracuse
[revised March 1985]), Tables 21, 28, 46, 62 and 71.
tax treatment should dictate business and individual economic decisions, and that, in any case, the administrative system could not implement such a program. Experience with the existing system, which
is in more of an interventionist tradition, was that progressive rate structures were not generating a
progressive distribution of tax burdens, complicated provisions for payroll taxes of the self-employed
could not induce them to make payments, tax incentives for overtime were being abused and not leading
to increased overtime work, a system of nontaxable perquisites had become a major loophole rather than
a tax relief and was beyond the control of the income tax administration, etc.
This assessment of problems and definition of objectives of the project led to a three-part program
for the tax reform: policy analysis to restructure the system, improved administrative procedures, and
the establishment of a training program. The basic tenet of the tax reform project was that the reform
should be comprehensive and that the administrative improvements should follow the policy changes.
To try to improve the administration of a system so deficient as that in Jamaica clearly would have been
counterproductive .
The Reform Program

Simulation of alternative rate and base structures, with a revenue neutral target in mind and
simplification and neutrality as primary objectives, led to the following reform program:

•
•
•
•

Replace
Replace
With a
Include

the 16 tax credits with a standard deduction of J$8580 per year.
the present rate structure with a flat rate of 33-1/3 percent.
few exceptions, bring all nontaxable allowances into the base.
bank deposit interest (above some ceiling) in the income tax base.
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The Government enacted the program after a Tax Reform Committee

spent several months scrutinizing and amending the proposals. The Committ
ness and public interest group representatives, reached consensus that the fl
the present system and recommended its adoption to the Prime Minister. Th
effetive at the beginning of 1986 and was almost totally operative by the en
In early 1987, the government also moved to restructure the company in

companies paid a basic rate of 35 percent plus an "additional tax" of 10

could be offset against withholding tax on dividends. To complicate matters
treatment for agricultural companies, incentive firms and financial instituti
basic problems. First, the tax was complicated, not easily administered, and
of firms. Second, it discriminated in favor of debt and against equity fin
distribution rate for a firm was about 27 percent of profits - above this amo

liability would be due. Moreover, in the eyes of investors, dividends wer
profits and as taxalbe personal income) whereas interest received from sav
Third, the reduction in the top personal income tax rate to 33-1/3 percent
corporate rate brought new pressures to lower the company tax rate.
The comprehensive reform of the company tax in 1987 addressed these p
reduced to 33-1/3 percent and the "additional tax" was eliminated. This r
larger dividend distributions, and though the Government did not eliminate
idends, it did bring interest income into the tax base thereby removing an

finance.

A Successful Income Tax Reform?

No effort has yet been mounted to systematically monitor the impacts of the flat tax refor
to try to estimate the separate economic effects of the tax reform. The major problem, of cours
be to try to separate the effects of tax changes from the effects of everything else that is affe

Jamaican economy. Still, from the macro evidence, there is some indication of success. Perh

best indicator is the absence of any continuing public discontent with the tax reform. The press

been critical, the political opposition has not raised continuing objections, labor seems to be
with the relatively high standard deduction and with the equality associated with a flat rate,

business community clearly has benefited from the lower company tax rate. To be sure, there w
resentment to taxing interest income - this led to exemption for small deposits - and there was
pected grousing from special interests about the loss of tax preferences. The important point, h
is that the public seems to have adjusted to the initial shock of the change and though taxes a
as low or even as fair as citizens would like, the new system would appear to be much more
than the previous one.
Have the income tax reforms stimulated the economy in 1986 and 1987? Something has. C
profits are up - through August 1987 the 16 largest listed companies are reporting post-tax p

percent higher than the same period last year. The Jamaican stock exchange has had record
during 1986 and 1987. The market index went from 941.5 at the end of 1985 to 1499.8 at th
1987 and now stands at 1757.7 (9/22/87). Of course, the tax reform has been only one of a n
of positive factors affecting the Jamaican economy. The interest rate has dropped from 23 p
the beginning of 1986 to 16.7 percent by latest available figures for 1987. The real growth in
was up by 10.3 percent in 1986 over the 1980-1985 period average and real GNP increased
percent in 1986. The rate of inflation declined from 25.7 percent for all of 1985 to 15.1 per

1986, and was running at 7.1 percent for the first five months of 1987. None of this is to say t
reform has solved Jamaica's long-run economic problems, or even that the economy is now o
reversible growth path. On a basis of available evidence, no one could argue the extent to w
short-run performance is due to the tax reform, but many would be prepared to argue that so f
a performance of the Jamaican economy could not have taken place under the old regime.
If an evaluation is made on the more traditional taxation criterion, the result is also posit
revenue neutrality target of the reform has been attained, perhaps even surpassed. Comparing th
quarter in the first year of the reform (1986) with 1985, PAYE collections were up 9.7 percen

1987, the same comparison shows a 17.9 percent increase over 1986. Total company and

income taxes in the second quarter of 1987 were running about 18 percent above second quar
collections - a substantial increase in real terms. Some part of this increase is due to admini
The simpler income tax system has made it possible for the income tax department to concentra
on enforcement of the system and there is evidence of a more effective audit and examination a
More vigorous audit activities have led to a tripling of additional taxes and penalties over 198

Finally, there is the question of the fairness of the new reform. The tax reform project has e
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that the combination of the lower, flat rate, the J$8580 standard deduction and broadened base did
increase the regressi vity of the system and, indeed, that improved administration holds the prom
making the new system more progressive than the old.
The reform is not without problems - no reform ever is. Perhaps the major problem is that the
was left open for abuse on some perquisites - the housing allowance, the travel allowance, and un
allowances. There already appear to be some misuses of these provisions for nontaxable income
they continue to grow they could compromise the fairness of the new structure and bring pressur
a rate increase. Provision has not yet been made to index the standard deduction and this could be a
important policy problem, especially if the rate of inflation were to return to higher levels. To mi
the burden on lower income savers, there is no tax on interest of bank deposits of J$2000 or les

could encourage some splitting of deposit holdings by higher income depositors. While these a
potential problems, all can be dealt with by a continuing policy review.
Footnotes

'Before the Jamaica Tax Structure Examination Project (JTSEP) was initiated in 1983, we c

identify two efforts to carry out research to support a comprehensive tax reform: International M

Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department, Taxation in Jamaica , January 1979; World Bank "Jamaica: A
of the Tax System 1984 (mimeograph); and the much earlier study by J. R. Hicks and U. K.
Report on Finance and Taxation in Jamaica (Kingston: Government of Jamaica, 1955).
2The average statutory income for PAYE taxpayers was about J$8,000 in 1983.

THE TAX TREATMENT OF INTEREST INCOMES AND EXPENSES IN INDUSTRIAL

COUNTRIES: A DISCUSSION OF RECENT CHANGES
Vito Tanzi*

International Monetary Fund

The tax treatment of interest incomes and expenses was not, traditionally, a major issue
finance. Little if any space was assigned to it in public finance textbooks and it received little a
on the part of legislators. Around the mid-1970s, however, it started attracting attention. T
part the result of high rates of inflation that raised the question of whether real or nomina
incomes should be taxed and whether real or nominal interest expenses should be deducted.
I. Theoretical Background

When the rate of inflation is positive, the nominal rate of interest charged on loans m
if the lender's real income from interest received and the borrower's real cost of borrowin
unchanged. In a world without income taxes, an increase in the market interest rate equal
inflation would keep the real rate of return on, and the real cost of, loans at the preinflati
nominal interest incomes are taxed and nominal interest payments are deductible expenses
in the nominal rate must be equal to r* where
a
r*

1 - t

=

r

H

In this equation r* can be called the "required" rate; r is the rate that would have prevailed in the
absence of inflation;1 2 a is the rate of inflation; and t is the rate at which interest income is taxed. If
this "required" rate were established, the impact of inflation on lenders and borrowers would be neutral.3
If income taxes were proportional, the t in equation (1) would be the same for all taxpayers regardless of their income level. However, income taxes are progressive. Therefore, taxpayers are taxed
at different rates depending on the level of their incomes. Equation (1) must be rewritten as
r*

1 - t¡

=

r

+

*Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be considered as official
Fund views. Comments received from Kenji Aramaki and Krister Andersson are appreciated.
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